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Abstract: Decentralized systems are a subset of dis-
tributed systems where multiple authorities control dif-
ferent components and no authority is fully trusted by
all. This implies that any component in a decentralized
system is potentially adversarial. We revise fifteen years
of research on decentralization and privacy, and provide
an overview of key systems, as well as key insights for
designers of future systems. We show that decentralized
designs can enhance privacy, integrity, and availability
but also require careful trade-offs in terms of system
complexity, properties provided, and degree of decen-
tralization. These trade-offs need to be understood and
navigated by designers. We argue that a combination
of insights from cryptography, distributed systems, and
mechanism design, aligned with the development of ad-
equate incentives, are necessary to build scalable and
successful privacy-preserving decentralized systems.
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1 Introduction: the Long Road
from 2001 to 2016
The successful adoption of decentralized systems such as
BitTorrent [24], Tor [57], and Bitcoin [112], and the rev-
elations of mass surveillance against centralized cloud
services [74], has contributed to the wide belief that de-
centralized architectures are beneficial to privacy. Yet,
there does not exist a foundational treatment or even
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an established common definition of decentralization.
In this paper we aim at defining decentralization and
systematizing the ways in which a system can be de-
centralized, and, by presenting the key design decisions
in decentralized systems, bring forth past lessons that
can inform a new generation of decentralized privacy-
enhancing technologies.
This is not the first time there has been a surge
of interest in decentralization. As Cory Doctorow noted
at the 2016 Decentralized Web Summit: “It’s like being
back at the O’Reilly P2P conference in 1999,” which
signaled a peak of interest around decentralized archi-
tectures at the turn of the millennium [118]. The ‘hype’
around decentralization was followed in the early 2000s
by research and deployment activity around decentral-
ized systems.
To some extent, decentralization was originally a
response to the threat of censorship. Perhaps the first
rallying cry for decentralization was the Eternity Ser-
vice [8]. Anderson created this system in response to the
success of the Church of Scientology at closing down the
anon.penet.fi remailer [77] “as a means of putting elec-
tronic documents beyond the censor’s grasp.” This moti-
vation of censorship resistance is clear in more modern
systems: Tor using a decentralized network of anony-
mous relays and a DHT-based hidden services nam-
ing infrastructure; Bitcoin emerging as a censorship-
resistant way to transfer funds to organizations like
Wikileaks after the centralized e-Gold [62] online cur-
rency had been shut down by the Department of Justice;
or BitTorrent succeeding as a peer-to-peer (P2P) file
sharing service using Mainline DHT [164] rather than
having a central indexing service like Napster that could
be subject to requests to keep track of file copying [6]. In
each of these cases, decentralization arose as a response
to the shutdown of a centralized authority, aiming to
remove that single natural point of failure.
Despite the millennial fervour for decentralization,
the 2000s witnessed the rise of massively distributed,
but not decentralized, data centers and systems as the
dominant technical paradigm embodied by the Cloud
computing capabilities offered by Google, Facebook, Mi-
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crosoft, and others. Eventually, users were diverted away
from software running locally on their machines, which
essentially is a form of decentralization, towards cloud
applications that enabled an unprecedented aggregation
of user data by the providers. Snowden’s revelations in
2013 on mass surveillance programs leveraging the cen-
tralized nature of these services gave credence to long-
standing privacy concerns brought about by the rise and
popularity of centralized services.
The desire to preserve privacy, liberty, and the au-
tonomous control of infrastructure and services have led
to a call to “re-decentralize” the Internet [128, 179]. As
a result, in the 2010s we are observing an upsurge of
alternatives to centralized infrastructures and services,
although most alternatives to Cloud-based applications
are still under development.
It is important for system designers to neither be
nostalgic about past systems nor fatalistic about future
ones. Today’s networking and computing environments
are vastly different from those in 2000: Smart-phones
have placed a powerful computer in people’s pockets;
users are usually connected to the Internet over fast con-
nections without time or bandwidth caps; clients, such
as web browsers, are now mature end-used platforms
with P2P communications enabled and cryptographic
capabilities; and mobile code, in the form of Javascript,
is ubiquitous.
Even though the design space for modern decentral-
ized systems is less restricted than in the past, funda-
mental challenges remain. Our key objective is to sup-
port future work on decentralized privacy systems by
systematizing the past 15 years of research, between
O’Reilly’s publication of “Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the
Power of Disruptive Technologies” [118] in 2001, and
2016. We aim at highlighting key findings in classic de-
signs, and also the important problems faced by design-
ers of past systems, so as to inform the choices made by
engineers pursuing decentralization today.
2 Epistemology
Scope. There is a wide use of the term ‘decentralized’.
In this paper, we restrict ourselves to discussing systems
that support privacy properties using decentralized ar-
chitectures. We draw a distinction between decentralized
and distributed architectures, as follows:
Distributed system: A system with multiple compo-
nents that have their behavior co-ordinated via message
passing. These components are usually spatially sepa-
rated and communicate using a network, and may be
managed by a single root of trust or authority. Distri-
bution is beneficial to support robustness against sin-
gle component failure, scalability beyond what a sin-
gle component could handle, high-availability and low-
latency under distributed loads, and ecological diver-
sity to prevent systemic failures. Developments led by
Google, ranging from BigTable [35] to MapReduce [49]
are good examples of distributed systems.
Decentralized system: A distributed system in which
multiple authorities control different components and no
single authority is fully trusted by all others.
Following Baran [13], systems are conceived of as
networks of interconnected components, where all the
components of a system form a graph, where the nodes
of the graph are the components and the edges the con-
nections between them (see Fig. 1). Due to this anal-
ogy with graphs, the terms “decentralized network” and
“decentralized system” tend to be used interchange-
ably. However, decentralized systems are not just net-
work topologies, but systems that exist to fulfill some
function or set of functions, otherwise called ‘opera-
tions.’ These operations are accomplished by passing
messages between a sender and a receiver node, with
other nodes serving as proxies to relay the message [91]
(right graph in Fig. 1). On the contrary, in centralized
systems messages and operations are orchestrated by a
central trusted authority (depicted as an orange circle
in the left graph in Fig. 1).
Centralized systems may be distributed, typically
for efficiency or scaling, but not for privacy, and so the
underlying components are fundamentally trusted. Only
external entities are considered adversarial. Widely de-
ployed systems such as Bitcoin, BitTorrent, and Tor are
on the other hand decentralized. Contrary to generic
distributed systems, in participating parties may choose
their relationships of trust autonomously, including the
case where there one may not trust any other compo-
nents. This has profound implications in terms of se-
curity and privacy: no single entity that can act as a
trusted computing base (TCB) [135] to enforce a global
security or privacy policy. Any internal component of
the system may be adversarial, in addition to external
parties, requiring defences in depth.
In terms of security and privacy we adopt the fol-
lowing broad definitions, that we make more detailed
at the corresponding section when the context requires
clarification or preciseness.
Security: We consider the security aspects of a system
to be those that encompass traditional information se-
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Centralized Decentralized
3.2 What is gained?
3.4 What is lost?
3.5 What is still 
centralized?
3.1 How is 
the system 
decentralized?
3.3 How is 
privacy 
supported?
Fig. 1. From centralized to decentralized systems
curity properties. This include of course confidentiality,
integrity, and authentication; but also less traditional
ones such as availability, accountability, authorization,
non-repudiation or non-equivocation.
Privacy: We consider the privacy aspects of a sys-
tem to be those related to the protection of users’ re-
lated data (identities, actions, etc.). This protection
is usually formalized in terms of privacy properties
(anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability, unobservabil-
ity) for which we follow the definitions by Pfitzmann
and Hansen [121]. These definitions are extended in the
privacy-oriented discussion in Section 3.3.
Methods & Model. To systematize knowledge in de-
centralized privacy-preserving systems we performed a
systematic literature review of all papers published in
the top 4 computer security conferences (IEEE S&P,
ACM CCS, Usenix Security, NDSS) as well as the spe-
cialized conferences (PETS, WPES and IEEE P2P) that
are proposing or analyzing decentralized systems with
privacy properties, from the years 2000 to 2016.
Our first analysis resulted in 165 papers (28 from
IEEE S&P, 56 from ACM CCS, 18 from Usenix Security,
11 from NDSS, 11 from PETS, 10 from WPES, and 31
from IEEE P2P). Finally the paper contains only 90 ref-
erences from these venues (13 from IEEE S&P, 32 from
ACM CCS, 10 from Usenix Security, 11 from NDSS, 9
from PETS, 6 from WPES, and 9 from IEEE P2P), 19
are well-known deployed systems that do not have an
associated peer-reviewed publication, and the rest come
from an additional pool of 30 conferences and work-
shops (among them FOCI, WEIS, NSDI, SIGCOMM,
SIGSAC, or CRYPTO). The selection was done on the
basis of highlighting design decisions that reflect a key
lesson worth of future reference.
Due to the vast amount of identified designs, by ne-
cessity we do not describe each system in detail, but
instead show how each system exemplifies a property or
design choice. We do, though, expand upon Tor, Bit-
Torrent, and Bitcoin as they are are heavily deployed
and have substantial academic analysis. As illustrated
in Figure 1, we study the pool of selected designs with
the intention to determine:
1. How is the system decentralized? (Section 3.1)
2. What advantages do we get from decentralizing?
(Section 3.2)
3. How does decentralization support privacy? (Sec-
tion 3.3)
4. What are the disadvantages of decentralizing? (Sec-
tion 3.4)
5. What implicit centralized assumptions remain?
(Section 3.5)
6. What can we learn from existing designs? (Sec-
tion 3.6)
Insights.
– The key difference between distributed systems and
decentralized systems is one of authority and trust
between components. Differences in architecture and
use of security and privacy controls stem from it.
– Decentralized systems embody a complex set of rela-
tionships of trust between parties managing different
aspects of the system. Untrusted insiders are com-
mon, and security controls must be deployed taking
into account adversaries within the system.
– In distributed, but not decentralized, systems the
existence of a single authority that provisions and
manages all components that are trusted enables the
use of simple security, many times based on dedi-
cated trusted components that act as roots of trust.
– In decentralized systems no single authority can pro-
vision a root of trust or trusted computing base,
making security mechanisms reliant on those (such
as central access control or traditional public key in-
frastructures) inapplicable.
3 Decentralization and Privacy
This section runs over the key questions we pose in the
previous sections with regards to the current state of
affairs in decentralized systems. Table 1 (page 320) pro-
vides a summary of the different design decisions and
the properties achieved as a result.
3.1 How Is Decentralization Achieved?
We review key architectural decisions: how to orches-
trate the infrastructure of the network, how to route
messages, and how to distribute trust between nodes.
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3.1.1 Infrastructure
A first key choice concerns the distribution of tasks
needed for maintaining a service within the system.
The provisioning of infrastructure impacts the design
in terms of trust and message routing.
User-based Infrastructure. Some decentralized sys-
tem consist solely of nodes that are users and there is
no additional infrastructure. They rely solely on users
to collectively contribute resources (bandwidth, storage)
in order to provide a service. The advantage of this de-
sign is that by nature it does not require a third-party
centralized authority. This user-based design can sup-
port services such as hosting of encrypted data, e.g. in
Freenet [41] and Cachet [117]. A disadvantage is that
user-based infrastructure may lead to poor performance
due to evolving into sparsely connected topologies, and
to “churn” caused by peers constantly joining and leav-
ing the network.
User-independent Infrastructure. Here, the func-
tions of the decentralized system are realized by nodes
that are not users. A set of third-parties that are not
necessarily trusted may provide all or part of the func-
tionality to users. This design pattern underlies clas-
sic open federated protocols such as SMTP [123] and
XMPP [9] based on a client-server model. The ad-
vantages of user-independent infrastructure include in-
creased availability of the service, a reduced attack sur-
face, and immunity to user churn. Servers do not nec-
essarily threaten user privacy. The Eternity Service [8],
as realized in systems like Tahoe-LAFS [139], combined
encryption with the use of several servers controlled
by different non-collaborating authorities for the pri-
vate storage and replication of files. Other examples of
systems that rely on user-independent infrastructure in-
clude DP5 [27] and Riposte [42] in terms of Private In-
formation Retrieval [39] or anonymous communication
systems like mix networks [36] or DC-nets [37].
Hybrid Systems. Functions may be shared between
users and nodes run by third-parties. An example is
Tor, where relays are mainly run by volunteers but Di-
rectory Authorities are operated by a closed ‘known’
group of servers. In terms of privacy and security, new
elements such as distributed ledgers decentralize tradi-
tionally centralized cryptographic protocols in these hy-
brid systems. For example, computations can be locally
and securely recorded to the blockchain with the sup-
port of multi-party computation protocols [189], even
without a trusted third party [10, 189], or using a small
number of stable entities to ensure reliability and low-
latency, as in the Sharemind MPC system [26].
3.1.2 Network Topology
When considering a decentralized system, there are two
distinct topologies. The first, network topology describes
the connections between nodes used to route traffic; and
the second, authority topology describes the power re-
lations between the nodes. Thus, the network routing
structure does not necessarily have to mirror how au-
thority is decentralized in a system, although it often
does. That can greatly affect the security and privacy
properties of the system [53]. It must be noted that com-
ponents of traditional network routing is done in a hier-
archical manner, including spanning tree protocols such
as in BGP [130] in the current Internet as well as ‘next
generation’ designs like SCION [186].
Mesh. Mesh topologies are unstructured. Nodes can
route messages to every other node they are con-
nected with. One advantage is that mesh networks func-
tion in settings with no stable connections to other
nodes to guarantee service in the presence of massive
churn and changing connectivity, such as in mobile ad-
hoc networking and file sharing in early versions of
Gnutella [73]. A particularly popular communication
means in mesh topologies [112] are gossip protocols. In
gossiping, as opposed to flooding, a random subset of
the nodes in the network are chosen to receive the mes-
sages. These nodes then continue to broadcast the mes-
sage via another independently selected random subset
of the network to relay messages. The reliability of mes-
sage delivery under load is questionable and information
propagation experiences delays. Historically mesh net-
working does not preserve user privacy of their users,
but recent secure messaging systems such as Briar [28]
use this topology to remain functional during Internet
blackouts.
Distributed Hash Tables (DHT). DHTs are network
topologies where each node maintains a small routing
table of its neighbours, and messages are passed greed-
ily to known nodes that are ‘closer’ to the intended re-
cipient. Although efficient and decentralized, DHTs do
not by themselves provide strong security, privacy and
anonymity properties. While decentralized, DHTs are
not secure and privacy-preserving by default: Tran et
al. [153] show that low latency anonymity systems based
on DHTs such as Salsa [113] are vulnerable to having
large amounts of traffic captured by adversaries control-
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ling a fraction of the relays. DHT nodes may, however,
be grouped into byzantine quorums to defeat adversaries
that control a minority of nodes [180].
Super-nodes. Super-nodes are nodes that are endowed
with more, and contribute more, resources to the sys-
tem. This may be in terms of computation power, stor-
age, or network connectivity, stability and up time. In
terms of routing, such super-nodes may be used to me-
diate operations requiring higher network throughput.
They can be arranged in structured topologies, designed
to leverage them; or they may emerge naturally in un-
structured topologies, as a result of some nodes commit-
ting more resources. Most P2P systems such as BitTor-
rent eventually rely on super-nodes [50]. These super-
nodes have serious implications on availability and in-
tegrity, as they may become targets for attack, and pri-
vacy, as they mediate, and are in a privileged position
to observe, a larger fraction of activities.
Stratified. Some of the more complex decentralized
systems use a stratified design where nodes have spe-
cialized roles in terms of routing, or other functions. A
paradigmatic example is the Tor network. Tor users au-
tonomously form circuits from an open-ended set of Tor
relays, in layers of entry guards, middle nodes and exit
nodes. A high-integrity global list of these relays is main-
tained through consensus by a closed group of special-
ized Directory Authorities. Simultaneously, Tor hidden
services are resolved through a Hidden Service Direc-
tory maintained by a simple DHT topology. We note
that, on some level, Tor has also evolved to use super-
nodes on its topology and the distribution of traffic sent
through Tor relays is far from uniform [84]. Cascades,
are a particular case of Stratified topologies in anony-
mous communications, in which paths are pre-defined.
The advantages and disadvantages of such choice as op-
posed to free routes has been discussed in [52].
3.1.3 Authority
We now consider the relation among nodes in terms of
authority and describe mechanisms to mitigate the po-
tentially effects of power disparity that could potentially
harm the security and privacy of users.
Ad-hoc: Nodes Interact Directly. In ad-hoc there
is no relationship of authority among nodes. Nodes di-
rectly interact with each other without the participation
of other nodes, and they do so for the benefit of the
involved parties only. In terms of routing, ad-hoc re-
quires a mesh topology where nodes do not carry traffic
for other nodes. However, note that mesh topologies do
not always have a ad-hoc (lack of) authority relations,
such as routing based on gossip. An example of this
type of system would be point-to-point communication
in Briar [28]. For purposes of privacy, direct interaction
bypasses possibly compromised nodes, but not network
adversaries. As for confidentiality, communications can
be encrypted between the two nodes, and can be ex-
tended to group communication using group key agree-
ment protocols [138].
P2P: Nodes Assist Other Nodes. P2P designs have
no central authority. Unlike ad-hoc interaction, nodes
provide services and resources to other nodes, such as
routing messages or storing blocks of data. Nodes have
equal authority and so each node may equally compel
any other node, although services and resources are usu-
ally provided according to their capacity. In other words,
P2P systems self-organize and all nodes are responsible
for carrying out operations for all other nodes, rather
than having any pre-configured special position of au-
thority. Since nodes are not motivated by authority to
help each other, mechanisms should instead be in place
to provide ‘incentives’ for collaborative behaviour.
There are clear advantages for the security and
privacy properties in P2P systems. Information about
peers is not centralized and interaction typically remains
local to a few nodes, so it is difficult for an adversary
to obtain a global view of the system. Yet, relying on
peers for functionality poses an additional threat to pri-
vacy, since requests may be served by adversarial nodes.
These nodes can passively collect information on other
nodes or they may actively disrupt the integrity of op-
erations by forging messages or replay attacks that are
hard to detect. Furthermore, since P2P systems are usu-
ally open, without any admissions control, adversaries
may purposely inject a large number of Sybil nodes, to
increase their chances of a successful attack [59]. P2P
systems are not a silver bullet for decentralization: there
is no clear and definite solution to Sybil attacks in P2P
networks, although such an attack can be mitigated us-
ing reputation [43] or trust [83].
Social-based: Nodes Assist Friends. These designs
take advantage of pre-existing decentralized relation-
ships, such as “friendship”. In terms of applicability
of security mechanisms this approach maintains most
advantages of a P2P system. It is less vulnerable to
Sybil attacks as adversarial nodes can be excluded from
participating in the network or may be easier to de-
tect [47], as it is harder to infiltrate a social network
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than a network. The downside is that, without cover
traffic, a global passive adversary can discover the un-
derlying social graph by monitoring network commu-
nications and violate privacy properties such as unob-
servability and unlinkability. This in turn may lead to
user deanonymization [114], and techniques such as per-
turbation of the underlying graph may not be robust
enough to prevent this [107].
A number of systems implement social-based com-
munication to resist Sybil attacks. For instance Drac [44]
and Pisces [108] use social-networks to support routing
of messages. X-Vine [105] is a mechanism that, applied
to distributed hash tables, helps resisting denial of ser-
vice via Sybil attacks at the cost of higher latency. Tri-
bler [124] uses social-based trust relations to improve
performance that exploits similarity to improve perfor-
mance, content discovery, and downloading in file shar-
ing; or Nasir et al.’s socially-aware DHT [116], which
reduce latency and improve the reliability of the com-
munication.
Federated: Providers Assist Users. In federated de-
signs, users are associated to provider nodes, which they
trust and that act as authorities. Each provider is re-
sponsible only for its own users but collaborates with
other providers in order to provide a service. No single
provider has authority over other providers, and thus
there is a “federation” of providers. Federated author-
ities typically use user-independent infrastructure and
act as a super-node in terms of routing. This combina-
tion of design choices leads typically to high availability
as long as the provider is accessible and not compro-
mised, but the provider is a central point of attack to
violate security properties and the provider itself can
violate the privacy of nodes. The primary weakness of
federated systems is the assumption that federated ser-
vice providers largely act honestly. Some techniques can
relax strong trust assumptions in the provider. End-to-
end encryption can maintain confidentiality [145] using
providers. Computation can be obscured using secret
sharing [133] or differential privacy-based solutions [3].
Accountability: Transparency Assists Users.
Transparency can be used to make an authority ac-
countable in order to establish trust. It promotes in-
tegrity of operations by monitoring the correct behavior
of nodes, e.g. a transparent log of a provider’s opera-
tions in a federated system audited by users or other
providers acting in lieu of their associated users. The
nature of this auditor’s authority is very different from
the aforementioned previous types of authority relations
and critically relies on the non-collusion of the audi-
tor and the audited authority, e.g., Bitcoin consensus
over its blockchain using proof-of-work. Other alterna-
tives, such as Certificate Transparency [92], rely on a
set of services and auditors to keep track of X.509 cer-
tificates and quickly detect potentially rogue or hacked
certificate authorities. Similarly, electronic election pro-
tocols [75] achieve robustness through proofs of correct
shuffling of votes, e.g., Helios [1]. Yet naïve designs of
audit logs may violate the privacy of decentralized nodes
by learning too much information.
While decentralized accountability can have clear
advantages regarding integrity, there are difficulties in
maintaining privacy in any distributed log. This disad-
vantage can nevertheless be reduced as shown by Ze-
rocash [18], which uses zero-knowledge proofs in order
to maintain unlinkability in auditing relationships; or
CONIKS [101], that shows that auditing the consistency
of a name-key binding through time enables verification
of user public keys by the end users collectively and by
other providers, while concealing the identities and the
number of users at each provider using Verified Random
Functions.
Insights.
– Decentralization encompasses a large space of de-
signs from decentralized ad-hoc mesh to federated
super-node networks, not just peer-to-peer. These
offer a variety of privacy and systems (e.g., avail-
ability, or reliability) properties. Developer instincts
may often be incorrect in terms of their trade off.
– Despite being separate parts of the design, the net-
work topology in decentralized systems often mirrors
the authorities’ trust relationships. However, a strict
mapping between authority, infrastructure and net-
working topology is not necessary, and may come at
the cost of harming privacy or availability.
– Centralization in terms of federated and super-nodes
leads to better availability and system performance.
However, it introduces single points of failure that
impact availability and privacy. P2P models are by
design more resilient to unstable routing and com-
promises, but entail higher engineering complexity.
– All networking topologies suffer under node churn,
and pure P2P topologies must effectively address this
effectively to be applicable at all.
– Decentralization does not imply the absence of any
infrastructure. However, the infrastructure itself
needs to be decentralized by being provided by a plu-
rality of authorities. Such infrastructure may en-
hance performance by offering super-nodes or dedi-
cated high-availability operations.
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– De-facto super nodes may emerge naturally in de-
centralized designs, as a result of different node ca-
pabilities, and efficiency in centralizing certain op-
erations. If this occurs outside the context of careful
design, those super nodes become a single point of
failure, and may lead to de facto re-centralization.
– Lack of relationships of authority imply that nodes
must be willing to provide services to each other on
a different basis. Designers of decentralized systems
must carefully engineer such incentives, to ensure
that natural (non adversarial) selfishness does not
lead to dysfunction. Monetary incentives, reputa-
tion, and reciprocity can be the basis of such incen-
tives – but off the shelf such mechanisms are often
central points of failure.
3.2 The Advantages of Decentralization
In this section we discuss a number of perceived in-
trinsic architectural advantages to decentralized designs
that make them appealing compared to their centralized
counterparts.
3.2.1 Flexible Trust Models
An intrinsic advantage of decentralized architectures re-
lates to the existence of multiple independent authori-
ties. These create a distributed trusted computing base
that ensures that a subset of rogue nodes, at least up
to a certain threshold, cannot compromise the overall
security properties of the whole system.
Distributed Trust. Decentralized systems leverage
multiple independent authorities into a security assump-
tion: for example, all forms of threshold cryptogra-
phy [141] assure that if some fraction of participants
are honest, some security property can be guaranteed.
This principle can also be applied to secure multi-party
computation, distributed key generation, public ran-
domness and threshold-based decryption, and signing.
One such privacy system is Vanish [72] that guarantees
deletion after a pre-set expiry date. It illustrates how
a multi-authority system implements properties other-
wise impossible, or implausible, to when implemented
by a single entity. However, the system was in practice
defeated by a Sybil attack that the security properties
of its DHT did not take into account [172]. Reliance on
multiple authorities to regain a degree of privacy has
also been proposed for commercial cloud storage in case
some providers are dishonest [146].
No Natural Central Authority. In some settings
there exists no central authority and thus a decentral-
ized architecture is a natural choice. This setting has
been traditionally studied in the contexts of decentral-
ized access control, as in TAOS [171] and SDSI [64], and
‘trust management’, such as Keynote [25]. In such sys-
tems a set of distributed principals make claims about
users and each other, and those claims need to be assem-
bled and used to resolve access control decisions. Bauer
et al. [15] show that the task of resolving access control
decisions in a decentralized setting is faster than doing
so centrally.
Leveraging Existing Trust Networks. In some cases
a decentralized infrastructure embeds or expresses a pre-
existing set of trust relationships that a system may
reuse to support security properties. Systems may use
the underlying social trust structure to build overlay
privacy-friendly social network services, as surveyed by
Paul et al. [120]. As an example, the Frientegrity sys-
tem [68] provides a social network platform using un-
trusted providers seeing only encrypted data, where
users can exchange information with ‘friends’ protected
by cryptographic access control. This use of encryp-
tion to defend against the providers themselves is not
the case for systems like Diaspora [19], an open-source
project that takes a different approach: users connect to
a provider they trust – that gains full visibility of their
activity – and delegate the access control on the content
they share with their social circles to that provider.
3.2.2 Distributed Allocation of Resources Assists with
Ease of Deployment
A central premise of P2P networks is that nodes con-
tribute spare resources, and doing away with a central
authority that is forced to bear the full costs (such as
Google’s server costs). This reduces costs and helps ease
deployment by spreading these demands amongst multi-
ple parties. Costs are lowered as spare capacity in the ex-
isting infrastructure is used, e.g., underutilized resources
given by users such as the early SETI@home project [7]
and the use of users’ storage in Freenet [41].
In terms of availability, decentralized architectures
exhibit fewer correlated failures by virtue of being dis-
tributed. As an example the Cachet system [117] uses
a pool of untrusted peers as a storage back end of a
decentralized Online Social Network.
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3.2.3 Resilience Against Formidable Adversaries
Location Diversity. Decentralization provides proper-
ties that are inherently difficult to centralize, such as the
network location diversity needed for Tor bridges [56] to
bypass censorship both on the network and legal levels.
A number of designs take advantage of this, like Pub-
lius [163], in order to resist censorship, although cen-
sorship resistance itself is a separate field with many
centralized, as well as decentralized, solutions.
Survivability. Decentralized architectures can be de-
signed to survive catastrophic attempts to take them
down or inflict crippling damage, in a way that central-
ized systems cannot resist [176]. This property has been
used to build highly robust botnets using a peer-to-peer
architecture [134]. Although these bot-nets are decen-
tralized on the technical level, they of course maintain
central but covert command and control (C&C). Those
botnets have demonstrably been harder to take down
using conventional techniques, but are also vulnerable
to new threats that result from their decentralization,
such as poisoning and enumeration of nodes. A further
discussion of wider ‘Darknet’ survivability is provided
by Zhou et al. [97].
Separation of Development from Operations. De-
centralized architectures clearly separate the authorities
that provide public code – and that have no access to op-
erational data and secrets – and those that run the code.
Users and nodes, deploying software, can audit any such
open source code for integrity, and chose whether to de-
ploy it. The core development team maintains the code,
that is publicly visible and auditable, but upgrading is
up to independent relay operators. This model is fol-
lowed by both Tor and Bitcoin. As a result, attempts to
coerce the Tor development team can only have an in-
direct and possibly highly visible effect – rendering such
attempts less effective. Similarly in Ethereum, the ex-
ploitation of a vulnerability in the DAO smart-contract,
led to the core developers proposing a “hard fork”, and
this fork was voluntarily adopted by the majority of the
Ethereum mining node operators.
Publicly Verifiable Integrity. Due to the availability
of multiple independent authorities, decentralized sys-
tems can implement accountability mechanisms to pub-
licly verify integrity. Adversaries are disincentivised to
compromise nodes, by ensuring attacks have an observ-
able effect so that cheating can ideally be discovered
before it has a negative effect. Verifiable logs can be
used to help enable privacy as ensuring that actions are
transparent enables users to know what happened with
their data, as when Pulls et al. [125] use decentralization
to support transparent audits of personal data accesses.
Auditability is also a key feature of secure electronic
election systems such as the Helios system [1]. Such sys-
tems rely on the existence of multiple authorities in a
number of ways in e-voting: threshold cryptography is
used for parameter and ballot generation, with privacy
enforced via threshold decryption.
Insights.
– Real-world relationships of trust and authority are
personal, complex and localized, and rarely hierar-
chical or all-or-nothing. Decentralized systems offer
flexible trust models that can leverage those relation-
ships to support security and privacy properties.
– When it comes to high-availability and survivabil-
ity against powerful adversaries – particularly with
legal authority – decentralized designs are not just
best, but sometimes the only available option. De-
signs that allow operations to continue despite some
authorities being adversarial or not available, are
necessary to support these properties.
– Decentralization’s fundamental advantage in terms
of security stems from an attacker having to compro-
mise a set of independent authorities in order to dis-
rupt or weaken the security properties of a system.
Decentralized systems that do not offer this property
may be more fragile than centralized equivalents.
– Decentralized designs decouple development from
operations and have a multistakeholder governance
model, where node operators influence the entire
system based on the software configuration they
choose to deploy.
– Decentralized systems can leverage public account-
ability to detect and exclude compromised or misbe-
having authorities. Such accountability architectures
may be used instead of more complex or expensive
prevention techniques, but need to ensure that au-
diting will be effective and eventually acted upon.
– Leveraging spare resources of nodes allows decen-
tralized system to scale, and ease deployment. How-
ever, this by itself opens the door to high-churn and
cannot be a substitute for robust incentives to par-
ticipate as the system scales or nodes are asked to
take on real costs.
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3.3 How Does Decentralization Support
Privacy?
In this section we survey the privacy properties obtained
through mechanisms that are inherent to decentralized
architectures. We limit ourselves to the analysis of tech-
nical properties that may be obtained in decentralized
systems. We acknowledge that decentralized systems
may offer both greater user privacy and autonomous
control of the infrastructure. As such they are a possible
technological solution to the legally-binding, but often
technologically unenforced, demands from data protec-
tion laws [67, 136], that often are addressed involving a
central authority, the data controller [54]. How decen-
tralized systems relate to the law and business models
is out of the scope of this paper.
Confidentiality from Third Parties. Some designs
employ a decentralized architecture on the grounds that
the lack of centralized components, which have full ac-
cess to user data and can surveil their actions, would be
beneficial to confidentiality and unobservability. Such
systems may use threshold encryption [141] in order
to trade off information confidentiality and information
availability, such as the PASIS [176] architecture. This
scheme splits the data in n “shares” and distributes it
among peers in such a way that recovering m shares
allows one to recover the data, but having less pieces
provides no information. Similar solutions are provided
by POTSHARDS [148] or Plutus [87].
Confidentiality from Peers. In P2P architectures,
nodes must interact with other nodes, but they want
their communications or actions to remain confidential.
For example, nodes need to perform a joint computa-
tion, but do not trust each other nor a third party with
their data. In this case, decentralization enables them to
exchange encrypted data and obtain the sought after re-
sult without relying on any particular entity to preserve
their privacy. The P4P framework [60] is such a system,
in which further zero-knowledge proofs are integrated to
protect computations against malicious users. More re-
cent, blockchain-backed systems, such as Enigma [189]
rely more heavily on transparency to achieve this goal.
In terms of message-passing, systems that pass end-
to-end encrypted messages across untrusted federated
servers achieve peer confidentiality.
Anonymity. Due to the distribution of resources in
decentralized networks, it is expensive for one entity
to observe all actions in the network and track all ac-
tivities from a user. Many [70, 78, 100, 105, 113],
leverage this approach to provide anonymous com-
munication, although the precise properties provided
in terms of anonymity differ. Some decentralized sys-
tems fail to provide full anonymity but instead pro-
vide pseudonymity which is weaker [121], e.g. it al-
lows multiple anonymous actions to be linked, providing
weaker privacy, but enabling functionality such as de-
tecting returning users and reducing the complexity of
the system. For example, in Bitcoin every transaction is
linked to a pseudonym and stored in the blockchain.
This allows to trace money flows and avoid double-
spending; but on the downside if a pseudonym is ever
deanonymized (e.g. [21]), all actions from the person
would be revealed. A number of decentralized systems,
ranging from mix-nets [36, 45], to DC-nets [37], to
Tor [57], provide some degree of anonymity.
Deniability. Deniability enables a subject to safely and
believably deny having originated an action, so as to
shield her from responsibility associated to performing
such action. The fact that actions cannot be linked back
to a user (i.e. “unlinkability” [121]), equips users with
freedom to perform actions without fear of retaliation.
For instance, in Freenet [41] requests are hard to link to
their originator, thus users can freely search for infor-
mation without revealing their preferences.
Plausible deniability is crucial in facilitating anony-
mous and censorship-resistant publishing, and may be
implemented using cryptographic techniques allowing of
‘repudiation’. This was the motivation behind the orig-
inal Eternity service [8] and well-known designs such as
Publius [163]or Tangler [162].
Covertness. Some systems protect even the act of
participation of nodes in the decentralized network
from outside observers (“unobservability”[121] if the
items of interest is the existence of users). In addi-
tion to more well-known work like Tor pluggable trans-
ports [122], the Membership Concealing Overlay Net-
work (MCON) [157] leverages this to provide strong
forms of covertness. All nodes in MCON only have links
with trusted friends, and a complex overlay network is
jointly created that allows all nodes to communicate in-
directly with all nodes. As any node only connects to
other locally trusted peers, the system defends against
attempts to enumerate all users by malicious nodes.
Insights.
– The key bet of decentralized systems in terms of pri-
vacy is that a local adversary may not observe all
communications, data, or actions. However, global
adversaries are increasingly realistic. Thus decen-
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tralized systems that rely solely on dispersion of in-
formation to provide confidentiality are fragile.
– Decentralization can harm privacy: Distributing
trust and resource contribution to multiple author-
ities may provide adversarial nodes with extended
visibility of user data and network traffic. Thus,
naive decentralization designs may in fact create
more, not fewer, attack points to breach privacy.
– Decentralization alone cannot balance the needs for
privacy, integrity and availability. It is only com-
bined with the use of advanced cryptography that
decentralized architectures obtain those properties.
In particular, the reliance on others to perform ac-
tions, may naturally expose personal information to
other nodes without the use of cryptography. How-
ever, naive encryption alone may not be sufficient
to support the integrity of operations that are more
complex than end-to-end messaging.
– Decentralized networks can provide privacy proper-
ties like anonymity and even covertness. Yet, most
real-world decentralized systems do not use the ad-
vanced cryptography and traffic analysis resistance
necessary for that purpose as it increases design,
implementation, operations and coordination costs.
3.4 The Disadvantages of
Decentralization
Sadly, there is no free lunch in decentralization. While
decentralizing has many advantages, there is no guaran-
tee that the properties and features of centralized sys-
tems are maintained in the process. This section sum-
marizes problems emerging when decentralizing designs.
A further critique of decentralized systems, focusing on
personal data, is provided by Narayanan [115].
3.4.1 Increased Attack Surface
Decentralizing systems across different nodes inherently
augments the number of points (attack vectors) that an
adversary could use to launch an attack or to observe
the users’ traffic.
Internal Adversaries. In centralized systems, sys-
tem components can be monitored and evaluated by a
trusted entity to detect malicious insiders. In a decen-
tralized system it is easier to insert a malicious node
undetected. A number of such attacks have been doc-
umented against decentralized systems: the predeces-
sor attack [174, 175] uncovers communication partners
in many anonymous communication schemes [37, 57,
129, 150], or the Sybil attack which can be used to
bias reputation scores [59] or corrupt the information
exchanged in collaborative decentralized systems [82].
Furthermore, when messages are relayed through other
nodes, e.g., to gain anonymity, their content is exposed
to potential adversaries, as in Crowds [129] for Web
transactions or in Yacy [177] for searching information.
Traffic Analysis. Decentralization inherently implies
that information will traverse a network. Even in the
presence of encryption, metadata is available to exter-
nal adversaries. For instance, in anonymous commu-
nications networks it has been repeatedly shown that
both passive local [103] or (partially) global [84, 111],
as well as active adversaries [167], can reduce or break
anonymity by looking at traffic patterns.
Inconsistent Views. Decentralization typically im-
plies that nodes have a partial, thus non-consistent,
view of the network which can have an impact on in-
tegrity. These non-consistent views allow adversaries to
“cheat” without being detected. For instance, in Bit-
coin adversaries can perform double spending by forcing
non-consistency through fast operations [89], or eclipse
attacks [76] in which the adversary gains control over
all connections of a target node thus isolating her from
the rest of the network. Furthermore, the lack of global
information results in users not necessarily making the
optimal choices with respect to optimizing their privacy,
as studied both in the context of anonymous communi-
cations [55] and location privacy [71].
3.4.2 Cumbersome Management
An obvious problem of decentralization is that no entity
has a global vision of the system, and there is no cen-
tral authority to direct nodes in making optimal deci-
sions with regard to software updates, routing, or solv-
ing consensus. This makes the availability of a decen-
tralized network more difficult to maintain, a factor sig-
nificant enough to contribute in the failure of a system,
as pointed out by the Mojo Nation developers [168]. It
is very common that nodes in a decentralized system
have hugely varying capabilities (bandwidth, computa-
tion power, etc.) [69, 160], making super-nodes attrac-
tive targets [102]. Finally, decentralized systems need
to overcome the shortcomings of underlying technolo-
gies (such as NAT [98]), that favor the client-server
paradigm over peer-to-peer networking.
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Defense Difficulties. The lack of central management
hinders the establishment of effective protection mecha-
nisms. For instance, the non-consistent view of the net-
work not only enables attacks, but also hampers the
use of collaborative approaches to detect incorrect in-
formation [88]. Similarly, it becomes extremely difficult
to prevent Sybil attacks, and defenses must either lever-
age local information, for example defenses based on so-
cial networks [47, 181], or collaborative approaches that
combine information from several nodes [119].
Routing Difficulties. A straightforward consequence
of the lack of centralized control is an increased com-
plexity in routing. Nodes do not have an overview of
the network and its capabilities [149] and consequently
cannot globally optimize routing decisions [183], falling
back to inefficient flooding or gossiping methods in
mesh topologies. This is made harder by highly diverse
nodes [69], the existence of churn [11] and the reliance on
possibly malicious nodes [166]. Solutions to these prob-
lems include using complex routing algorithms to enable
secure and private discovery of nodes [100, 104, 108],
or avoiding the use of a centralized directory via next-
generation DHTs. The lack of centralized routing in-
formation in decentralized topologies also impacts per-
formance as it hinders the selection of optimal routes
or load balancing. We find two approaches to alleviate
this problem: using local estimations to improve perfor-
mance [4, 5, 152], or providing means for users to make
better decisions about routing individually [144]. The
latter is known to be prone to attacks [78, 110].
3.4.3 Lack of Reputation
Decentralization is also an obstacle to the implementa-
tion of accountability and reputation mechanisms. The
negative effect is amplified when privacy and anonymity
mechanisms are in place, as it becomes even more dif-
ficult to identify misbehaving nodes such as Sybils [79].
An effect of this lack of reputation is that nodes have
no incentive to behave correctly and can misbehave to
obtain advantages within the system (e.g., better per-
formance). This problem has been identified in many
settings such as P2P file sharing [184], multicast com-
munication [182], or reputation [79]. In particular, the
presence of churn, which make nodes short-lived and dif-
ficult to track over time, makes the establishment of rep-
utation to guarantee veracity a very challenging prob-
lem [127], even more if privacy has to be preserved [137].
Poor Incentives. Without reputation, reciprocity and
retaliation it is hard to establish incentive schemes for
nodes to not be selfish, in particular in a privacy pre-
serving manner. A solution to this problem is increas-
ing transparency of actions, e.g. by having witnesses
to report on malicious nodes in a privacy-preserving
manner [187]. However, the most popular approach is
the use of (anonymous) payments that incentivize good
and collaborative behavior that benefits all users in the
network [17, 38, 90]. In contrast, one example of nega-
tive reinforcement is the tit-for-tat strategy to encour-
age users to share blocks to incentivize sharing, as in
BitTorrent.
Insights.
– Decentralized designs may prevent conventional at-
tacks but also introduce new ones. Unless they are
carefully designed, they may expose personal infor-
mation to more, rather than fewer parties; and the
need to perform joint computation across many au-
thorities introduces threats to integrity.
– Decentralized systems are particularly susceptible
to traffic analysis, compared with centralized de-
signs, since their distributed operations are mediated
through networks and adversarial nodes that may
use meta-data to compromise privacy.
– Decentralized systems by nature require complex
management of routing, naming and consistent state
– due to the lack of a central coordinator. Con-
ventional defences against network attacks, like de-
nial of service, require centralization and cannot be
straightforwardly applied.
– Sybil attacks are the great unsolved problem of de-
centralized systems that allow open and dynamic
participation. Solutions based on social networks
rely on fragile social assumptions; admission con-
trol through identification or payment re-introduce
centralization. Proof-of-work defences increase the
cost of participation.
3.5 What Is Still Centralized in
Decentralized Designs?
Even when systems claim to be decentralized, usually
there are “hidden” centralized assumptions and parts of
the design that need to be centralized to operate cor-
rectly. These are often implicit.
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3.5.1 Centralization of Network Information &
Computations
In any decentralized system routing packets across the
network is a challenge for both operational and privacy
reasons. Typically routing can be divided in two main
task. The first task is how to find candidate nodes to
relay traffic, and second task is how to select among
these nodes. While as detailed in Sect. 3.1.2, there are
many decentralized algorithms to choose the route, ac-
tually finding candidate nodes is difficult, as highlighted
in Sect. 3.4.
Centralized Directories. A common solution for the
first problem is to assume that there exists a centralized
directory that knows all network members. The most
prominent example is the Domain Name System (DNS)
that resolves easy-to-remember domain names to asso-
ciated IP addresses in order to allow finding hosts in
the largest known decentralized system: the Internet.
Though distributed, this centralized service has serious
security implications, e.g. for privacy [109] or availabil-
ity [158], and thus several alternatives are being pro-
posed [161] and deployed [58]. Another example are Tor
Directory authorities [57] that provide Tor clients with
the full list of onion routers. These directories solve the
discovery problem but have become a bottleneck for the
scalability of the system [100]. How to decentralize these
authorities in an efficient, privacy-preserving manner is
an active area of research. Solutions are based on having
multiple copies of the publicly verifiable directory kept
consistent via consensus protocol and distributed via
gossiping, although it risks covertness; or to use friend-
of-a-friend discovery and routing [100, 106].
Path Selection. Once routing alternatives are known
the question remains: Which route to choose? Thus
typically, a centralized server is considered that can
“rank” routing options to allow for path optimiza-
tion with respect to adversaries [2, 12, 61, 86], perfor-
mance [143, 144, 159], or with respect to users’ repu-
tation [165]. Such a centralized ranking approach has
been shown to be vulnerable to attacks [14, 22]. Typ-
ically DHTs are the possible solution, although only a
few have the necessary security and privacy properties
for use in decentralized systems [46].
Distributed Computations.A number of decentral-
ized systems are designed with the assumption that
there is a central entity that performs computations on
the data collected by the nodes in the system. Paradig-
matic examples of this behavior are decentralized sensor
networks [34, 65, 188] where the challenge is to send
decentralized measurements to a “master” node, but
there exist other applications such as distributed net-
work monitoring for intrusion detection [126], anony-
mous surveys [80], or private statistics [63] in which,
even though nodes perform decentralized computations,
interaction with a central authority is needed to produce
the final result.
3.5.2 Trust Establishment
A challenge when decentralizing networks is to ensure
that nodes can be trusted to perform the actions they
are assigned or can authenticate themselves as the in-
tended receiver of a message. Often, to avoid dealing
with this problem, a common implicit centralized as-
sumption is that a set of trusted servers is assumed to
exist, such as in Dissent [173] or the Directory Author-
ities in Tor.
Decentralized trust establishment is still an open
problem, though some of the excitement around mining
in Bitcoin is precisely due to their attempt to avoid this
problem and so build a ‘trustless’ decentralized system.
Authentication. In general certificate infrastructures
are not decentralized, e.g., PKI. Therefore, some de-
centralized systems rely on centralized certification au-
thorities to authenticate nodes that can be used for
secure routing [33, 147], user authentication [29], or
to enrol users in the system in the context of anony-
mous credentials [16, 30, 31], a privacy-preserving alter-
native for authentication without requiring user iden-
tification. Such centralized authorities are simpler for
deployability or usability, but become a single point
of failure as pointed out by Lesueur et al. in [95].
They also introduce an imbalance of power unnatural
for decentralized environments since they allow a sin-
gle entity to revoke peers’ authentication credentials.
Many decentralized designs do not address authenti-
cation (e.g. [117, 142], see [120] for more details), al-
though work from TAOS [170] and SDSI [132] onwards
has been working in this direction [20]. Authentication is
useful to prevent Sybil attacks, and work on decentral-
ized and privacy-preserving authentication via thresh-
old cryptography is one promising solution [99], as is
the use of zero-knowledge systems for anonymous cre-
dentials [16].
Authorization. Assuming the existence of a central-
ized entity is also common when it comes to stor-
ing and enforcing authorization policies, as highlighted
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by numerous efforts to decentralize policy management
and enforcement from SDSI [132] to more recent sys-
tems [94, 96, 169]. OAuth was designed to be feder-
ated in terms of authorization, but in practice only a
few large providers use this standard [140]. So if an
adversary compromises a user’s single authentication
method such as a password, it can compromise them
across multiple decentralized systems. Work descend-
ing from SDSI [132] to limited-time authorization via
pseudonyms and blind signatures present one way for-
ward to decentralize authorization [99].
Abuse Prevention. As mentioned in Sect. 3.4 account-
ability is a challenge in decentralized systems. Hence,
existing abuse-prevention schemes end up relying on
centralized parties, often determining global reputa-
tion scores. Solutions based on blacklistable credentials
(anonymous credentials for which authorization can be
selectively revoked) use a centralized authority for en-
rollment [154, 155], or to store blacklists [85, 156]. Simi-
larly, identity escrow [23] or revocable anonymous com-
munication solutions [40], that allow for re-identification
of misbehaving users require a centralized party that
stores those identities. In practice, spam prevention in
federated email systems also uses centralized lists of
known spammers. Typically, these are built from pre-
existing trusted social networks, and only recently have
reputation systems such as AnonRep (based on homo-
morphic encryption and verified shuffles) allowed repu-
tation to be done in a privacy-preserving and decentral-
ized manner [185].
Payment Systems. In many applications of decen-
tralized services it could be desirable to count on a
payment system to reward peers for their contribu-
tions. While many alternatives have been presented in
the literature specifically aimed at peer to peer sys-
tems, e.g. [17, 32, 178], they inherently rely on a cen-
tralized authority that opens accounts (the bank) and
sometimes even on other authorities that can act as
“arbiters” in case of dispute [17], or on authorities
that record transactions to help taxation on the oper-
ations run in the system, even if the transactions are
anonymized [151]. Decentralized crypto-currencies can
help ameliorate this problem.
Trusted Developer Community. All decentralized
systems work by virtue of having the nodes communi-
cate via the same protocol. Thus, the actual software
can be a centralized point of failure if the protocol is
flawed. If the protocol is standardized or otherwise uni-
formly specified, the implementation of the protocol it-
self may be a failure. Furthermore, the developers them-
selves could be compromised. his danger is augmented
by the software monoculture prevalent in deployed sys-
tems, that results in a bug in a popular platform capable
of compromising a large set of authorities. One solution
is to apply the technique of forcing public transparency
and auditing of the integrity of the development process.
Open-source development, done in public repositories,
is increasingly required. Integrity is ensured via deter-
ministic builds [131] so that everybody can verify the
genuine binary, and the authority to run new versions
of the software remains in the hands of the operators.
This approach is already followed by Tor and increas-
ingly by Bitcoin, where the choice to deploy particular
open-source code is up to miners.
Insights.
– Many decentralized systems implicitly rely on cen-
tralized components to hold network information for
efficient routing or for establishing trust and defend-
ing against Sybil attacks.
– Essential user-facing infrastructure, from authenti-
cation to authorization is centralized even in decen-
tralized systems. Developing alternatives seems to
be an open problem, with no clear established de-
sign. For payments, Bitcoin has recently provided a
decentralized solution, but it suffers from a number
of scalability, privacy, and financial volatility prob-
lems.
– The developer community of a system is usually an
implicit centralized authority, making social attacks
on the developer community itself one of the largest
dangers to any decentralized system.
3.6 Systematization of Existing Designs
Table 1 presents a systematic analysis of decentralized
designs, clustered based on their principal goal. The
columns infrastructure, network topology, authority re-
lations, privacy properties, follow closely the definitions
of the previous subsections. We applied some level of
simplification to complex systems with multiple compo-
nents or multiple use-cases. The systematization focuses
on parts of the system relevant for its main use-case as
used in prototype or deployment.
Insights.
– Many systems that provide good coverage of privacy
properties and decentralization (usually via DHTs)
have not been widely deployed
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– Widely deployed systems either are user-
independent federated systems or user-based DHT-
based systems, both without advanced privacy prop-
erties.
– Hybrid and stratified systems such as Tor provide
provide advanced privacy properties at the cost of
centralized assumptions.
– The space of ad-hoc, mesh, and covert designs is
under-explored.
4 Future Research Lines
4.1 Address Decentralization’s
Shortcomings
To build the next generation of decentralized systems,
good will, slogans, and demands are not enough. What
is needed is a clear research plan. A number of de-
signs we review consider decentralization as a goal and
virtue in itself and do too little to address the inherent
challenge of maintaining privacy properties and deploy-
ment with high availability. In particular we studied in
Section 3.4 a number of those challenges: an increased
attack surface, with corrupt insiders; susceptibility to
peers violating privacy and vulnerability to traffic anal-
ysis, integrity and consistency attacks; expensive and
fragile routing; potential degradation in performance;
loss of central choke points to enforce security con-
trols; peer diversity and lack of incentives. These are
serious and real threats, and not acknowledging them
and confronting them head on leads to weak systems
that cannot credibly compete with centralized solutions.
This is demonstrated by the failure of Ethereum to
promptly address the DAO vulnerability [48]. Indeed,
decentralization in the style of early BitTorrent simply
ends up being an inefficient way to do redundancy and
availability without a centralized authority — and with
no credible privacy properties. Likewise, Bitcoin and
Ethereum provides this style of decentralization with
the addition of integrity but their simplistic account-
ability designs harms privacy. Therefore, more research
is required looking at systems such as Tor and Bitcoin
as platforms rather than purely as channels, including
understanding their interfaces, performance, quality of
service guarantees and the privacy properties as a whole
system in order to deliver better privacy properties.
Availability without centralization is a key promise
of decentralized systems, but often fails when the sys-
tem grows. The most important engineering challenge
of those reviewed is that decentralized systems often do
not scale and are inefficient in comparison to centralized
systems. In practice, in a world with limited resources
and investment, inefficient decentralization leads to a
failure of decentralization. This problematic dynamic
is built into decentralized designs: maintaining high-
integrity requires a majority to honestly participate in
decisions. Although one could point to Bitcoin as a suc-
cess, the larger Bitcoin network of miners grows the less
it scales, as all miners need to detect and verify new
blocks and transactions. Even worse, Ethereum smart
contracts are executed on each node in the network. In
both Bitcoin and Ethereum, as the number of nodes
grows, the system gets slower. Due to this unfortunate
design flaw, Bitcoin and Ethereum will face serious is-
sues when scaling without major design changes that ac-
countability as such does not address. We can be assured
the current generation of attempts to “re-decentralize”
the Internet will fail without more research on how to
scale efficiently.
Finally, there has to be a deeper acceptance that
even honest users and peers in decentralized systems will
have to be incentivised to participate and behave coop-
eratively. This is particularly true when stronger privacy
protections are implemented and reputation based on
repeated and iterated interactions cannot be leveraged.
In those cases standard platforms must be developed
to prevent Sybil attacks and establish privacy preserv-
ing reputation to curtail abuse; accounting and payment
mechanisms need to be devised to ensure that those that
do work are rewarded to sustain their operations. Sys-
tems that do not provide incentives for participation
in the infrastructure will fall foul of the tragedy of the
commons and will remain mere proofs of concepts.
Even with motivated users, human fallibility must
be addressed realistically. Decentralization advocates
desire of users to return to a ‘lost golden age’ of self-
hosting services, as in the ‘re-decentralize’ project [128].
However, the popularity of services like Facebook and
Gmail shows that most do not have the time or skills
to host decentralized nodes unless a powerful incentive
exists such as file-sharing. Worse, users may not be qual-
ified at protecting their own systems, when even most
skilled professional administrators cannot. Building suc-
cessful decentralized systems that do not betray the se-
curity and privacy of their users is hard, and entails
much more than tacking a blockchain or P2P network
to a pre-existing problem, but also has to take into ac-
count platform security and ease of user operations.
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4.2 Develop Design and Evaluation
Strategies
Systems that claim to be decentralized today simply
often use the adjective in an informal manner, result-
ing in decentralized “snake oil”, as is the case for some
blockchain-based start-ups. Unlike formal security defi-
nitions, information-theoretic definitions of anonymity,
and differential privacy, there are no coherent quanti-
tative metrics to characterize decentralization. Aside
from having a common definition of the privacy and
security properties, decentralization engineering also re-
quires the development of design strategies that measure
both decentralization and its effect on the properties
systematized earlier. More often than not, properties are
neglected, rarely mentioned or evaluated, including the
impact of decentralization and availability. Section 3.1,
for instance, illustrates the variety of options in this de-
sign space.
Beyond the impact of decentralization on availabil-
ity, a key missing piece is a systematic means for evalu-
ating the privacy and security properties provided by
a given decentralization system. As we evidence, de-
centralization can support privacy in many ways (Sec-
tion 3.3), as well as supporting other properties too
(Section 3.2). We observe that systems are often de-
signed with one particular privacy goal in mind, which
is frequently redefined to suit the design, and system
designers tend to resort to ad-hoc evaluation. A par-
ticular case in which a lack of systematic evaluation
has great impact in terms of understanding the pro-
tection provided by decentralized system is the case of
compound systems (i.e, systems that combine different
schemes to try to improve overall protection); or the
case where systems are deployed in environments with
different characteristics than those assumed in their de-
sign. In decentralized systems, it is not granted that the
protection of the whole is greater or equal than the sum
of the parts. In fact, the inverse may hold: combining
different decentralized systems with different assump-
tions may violate the properties each system guarantees
by itself. For example, while a user may assume using
BitTorrent over Tor provides anonymity for file-sharing,
in fact the reverse holds: Tor provides no anonymity to
UDP-based systems like BitTorrent, and users can even
be deanonymized by virtue of running BitTorrent [93].
In other words, systems to not exist in a vacuum. Their
analysis and evaluation needs to account for interactions
with their environment or other systems.
A similar trend is observed in terms of measur-
ing the severity of disadvantages introduced by decen-
tralization. Though, as we show in Section 3.4, many
weaknesses arise from decentralizing, few works evalu-
ate their implications, or do so in a design specific way
that is difficult to extrapolate to other systems. As a
result it is extremely difficult to compare systems and
find promising new directions. This slows the develop-
ment of robust decentralized systems by obscuring good
design decisions. For example, in many systems there is
a trade-off between privacy and availability.
Further work is also required to radically simplify
the deployment and management of “real-world” de-
centralized applications, either on larger platforms or
as stand-alone distributed systems. Deployability and
usable application life-cycle support is at the heart of
the current centralized cloud-based ‘dev-ops’ revolution,
and has made centralized app stores and Web applica-
tions as popular as they are. Yet, there are no equiva-
lent tools or technologies to facilitate the deployment,
management, and monitoring of decentralized systems,
let alone their continuous updates, application life-cycle
management, and telemetry. This gap negatively affects
developer’s productivity and makes the engineering and
maintenance of decentralized systems very expensive.
Building toolchains that support easy management –
without introducing any central control – is largely an
open research problem. Successful projects such as Tor
and Bitcoin have developed best practices and running
code in that space such as open-source development and
reproducible builds [131] to address security concerns
that may be generalized.
Key Research Questions for Decentralization.
– Are there generalized techniques to provide privacy
and integrity properties for decentralized systems
without damaging availability?
– Can we develop systematic techniques to evaluate
decentralized systems both in isolation and when
they are deployed in different environments?
– How can human users be incentivised to work in a
decentralized manner?
– How do real-world deployment of decentralization
lead to scalability challenges that change the desired
properties and defeat decentralization?
– Can we develop a mathematical metric to define de-
grees of decentralization?
In the next section we will provide provisional answers
to these questions to guide future research. These an-
swers will be based on the observations built in previous
sections.
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5 Conclusions: Towards Full
Decentralization
Availability, Privacy, and Integrity. Our analysis
points to some fundamental trade-off between availabil-
ity, privacy, and integrity in decentralized systems: A
good design for one is an unsafe design pattern for an-
other. Systems use a wide variety of infrastructure, net-
work topology, and authority relation choices (as sys-
tematized in Table 1). Three widely deployed decen-
tralized systems demonstrate a different set of design
goals. Bitcoin comes with high-integrity at the cost of
a public ledger with little privacy. Tor routers provide
high-privacy at the cost of no available or correct collec-
tive statistics to ensure the integrity of the entire sys-
tem. BitTorrent provides high availability in download-
ing files, but fails to provide privacy to its users against
powerful adversaries.
We believe it is not pre-ordained that there is a
trade-off between privacy, availability, and integrity in
decentralized systems by virtue of using advanced cryp-
tographic techniques. Unlike Bitcoin, Zerocash[18] com-
bines both privacy and integrity using zero-knowledge
proofs. Likewise, many academic systems, such as
Drac[44], tackle traffic analysis to defend privacy in a
P2P network. Simply put, advanced techniques for pro-
viding everything from dummy traffic for anonymity to
succinct zero-knowledge proofs are not yet part of the
toolbox for many decentralized system engineers.
Interdisciplinarity. Reviewing the literature reveals
that to build good secure privacy-preserving decentral-
ized systems, one needs:
– Expertise in building distributed systems, as decen-
tralized systems are by definition distributed.
– Knowledge of modern cryptography, as complex
cryptographic protocols are necessary to achieve si-
multaneously privacy, integrity and availability.
– An understanding of mechanism design, game the-
ory and sociology to motivate cooperation amongst
possibly selfish actors.
The focus on social incentive structures is usually left
out, and thus most decentralized systems do not gain
real-world wide deployment. In general, the involvement
of nodes in decentralized systems varies and this is usu-
ally mirrored in the power allowed to authorities, as
well as in inter-node relationships that reflect social be-
havior. Some designs assume centralized components,
for better availability and performance. Others push for
sheer decentralization, in pursuit of resilience to censor-
ship and network outages. Are these design choices often
social or political rather than technical? Most designs,
though, fall somewhere in the middle and generally im-
pose cryptographic techniques and rely on real-world
dynamics in order to defend against adversarial nodes.
Certainly, the way decentralization is achieved affects
the privacy of the users and thus their behavior. It falls
upon decentralized system designers to achieve satisfac-
tory performance and deployability, while taking into
account not just the technical but the necessary social
structure of the system.
Real-world Scalability. From our study of the liter-
ature, we have shown that a number of key functions
of decentralized systems often fall-back to centralized
models in practice for scalability, even when unneces-
sary. First, network directories, key management, and
naming often remain centralized. Thus, the there is a
need to design of collective high-integrity and re-usable
infrastructures to support directories, node discovery,
and key exchange. These mechanisms need to scale up
and remain decentralized, while not being open to cor-
ruption or inconsistencies.
Second, reputation and abuse control often require
either centralized entities, or building on pre-existing
social networks in user-based infrastructure. Even ad-
vanced privacy-preserving techniques, such as anony-
mous blacklisting, assume that centralized services will
issue and bind identities, and e-cash protocols rely on a
bank to issue coins and prevent double spending. More
work is required in establishing reputation in decentral-
ized systems and preventing abuse without resorting to
central points of control.
Third, it is important to make credible assumptions
about the platform security and computing environment
of end-users or other devices. It is too facile to heavily
rely on end-user systems keeping secret keys and data,
and ignore that they are often compromised. Achieving
perfect end-point security is an ambitious goal in and
of itself – and so needed but beyond the strict remit
of building secure decentralized systems. Decentralized
architectures that display or limit the effect of compro-
mises, and which may ‘heal’ and recover privacy prop-
erties following hacks, should be preferred to those that
fail catastrophically or silently under those conditions.
Defining Decentralization. In general, decentralized
systems are networks. Yet as shown by the difference
between network topologies for routing and the rela-
tionships of authority, a decentralized network is not
simply a single network, but multiple kinds of networks
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connected on different levels of abstraction. Worse, the
overly simplified models of decentralization presented in
many papers and research prototypes do not take into
account the changes produced by real-world usage into
account. As shown by BitTorrent, simple decentralized
networks tend to evolve from P2P into super-node sys-
tems. In general, as a system scales there is a tendency
towards distribution, but not decentralization, in order
to maintain efficiency. Using network science, one can
show simple models such as random graphs with basic
mechanism design such as preferential attachment scale
into small-world systems over time, and these systems
often simply transform into a federated client-server ar-
chitecture or a simple centralized distributed system.
In order to maintain decentralization as an emergent
property, it appears that advanced hybrid and stratified
system, e.g. Tor, are necessary to “unnaturally” main-
tain decentralization and the relevant privacy proper-
ties. Yet, the Tor network has many centralized techni-
cal (complete network information by directory author-
ities) and social assumptions (control by a core group of
developers). The key point of a real measure of decen-
tralization should be to take these more stratified de-
signs into account. An ideal decentralized system would
remove all centralized assumptions while maintaining
the needed security and privacy properties.
The ultimate bet of decentralized systems is still
open: is being vulnerable to a (possibly random) subset
of decentralized authorities better than being vulnerable
to a single centralized authority? Decentralization seems
to be the result of a breakdown in trust in centralized
institutions, but we do not yet understand how to build
decentralized social institutions to support decentral-
ized technical systems despite the promises of Bitcoin
to produce algorithmic monetary policy, or the promise
of Ethereum to support modern civilization with scripts
with dubious security properties. Decentralization is a
hard problem, but the fact that it is technically amend-
able to advanced techniques from distributed systems
and cryptography should indicate that the social ques-
tions at the heart of decentralization are not unsolvable.
Acknowledgements. The authors would like to thank
the reviewers for insightful comments that helped im-
proving the paper, in particular Prateek Mittal for act-
ing as shepherd. This work is supported by the EU
H2020 project NEXTLEAP (GA 688722).
References
[1] B. Adida. Helios: Web-based open-audit voting. In 17th
USENIX Security Symposium, 2008.
[2] M. Akhoondi, C. Yu, and H. V. Madhyastha. LASTor: A
low-latency as-aware tor client. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, 2012.
[3] D. Alhadidi, N. Mohammed, B. C. M. Fung, and M. Deb-
babi. Secure distributed framework for achieving -
differential privacy. In 12th Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Symposium, 2012.
[4] M. AlSabah, K. S. Bauer, and I. Goldberg. Enhancing
Tor’s performance using real-time traffic classification. In
19th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, 2012.
[5] M. AlSabah, K. S. Bauer, I. Goldberg, D. Grunwald,
D. McCoy, S. Savage, and G. M. Voelker. DefenestraTor:
Throwing Out Windows in Tor. In 11th Privacy Enhancing
Technologies Symposium, 2011.
[6] A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004. https:
//law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F3/239/239.F3d.
1004.00-16403.00-16401.html, 2001. Last accessed: June
29, 2017.
[7] D. P. Anderson, J. Cobb, E. Korpela, M. Lebofsky, and
D. Werthimer. Seti@ home: an experiment in public-
resource computing. Communications of the ACM,
45(11):56–61, 2002.
[8] R. Anderson. The Eternity service. In Pragocrypt, 1996.
[9] P. S. Andre. IETF RFC 6120 Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol (xmpp): Core. https://www.ietf.org/rfc/
rfc6120.txt, 2011. Last accessed: June 29, 2017.
[10] M. Andrychowicz, S. Dziembowski, D. Malinowski, and
L. Mazurek. Secure multiparty computations on Bitcoin. In
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2014.
[11] M. S. Artigas and P. G. López. On routing in Distributed
Hash Tables: Is reputation a shelter from malicious behav-
ior and churn? In 9th IEEE Conference on Peer-to-Peer
Computing, pages 31–40, 2009.
[12] M. Backes, A. Kate, S. Meiser, and E. Mohammadi. (noth-
ing else) MATor(s): Monitoring the anonymity of Tor’s
path selection. In 21st ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, 2014.
[13] P. Baran et al. On distributed communications. Volumes
I-XI, RAND Corporation Research Documents, August,
1964.
[14] K. S. Bauer, D. McCoy, D. Grunwald, T. Kohno, and D. C.
Sicker. Low-resource routing attacks against Tor. In ACM
Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, 2007.
[15] L. Bauer, S. Garriss, and M. K. Reiter. Distributed proving
in access-control systems. In IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, 2005.
[16] M. Belenkiy, J. Camenisch, M. Chase, M. Kohlweiss,
A. Lysyanskaya, and H. Shacham. Randomizable proofs
and delegatable anonymous credentials. In 29th Inter-
national Cryptology Conference Advances in Cryptology,
2009.
[17] M. Belenkiy, M. Chase, C. C. Erway, J. Jannotti, A. Küpçü,
A. Lysyanskaya, and E. Rachlin. Making P2P accountable
without losing privacy. In ACM Workshop on Privacy in the
Systematizing Decentralization and Privacy 325
Electronic Society, 2007.
[18] E. Ben-Sasson, A. Chiesa, C. Garman, M. Green, I. Miers,
E. Tromer, and M. Virza. Zerocash: Decentralized anony-
mous payments from Bitcoin. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, 2014.
[19] A. Bielenberg, L. Helm, A. Gentilucci, D. Stefanescu, and
H. Zhang. The growth of diaspora-a decentralized online
social network in the wild. In IEEE Conference on Com-
puter Communications Workshops, 2012.
[20] A. Birgisson, J. G. Politz, Úlfar Erlingsson, A. Taly,
M. Vrable, and M. Lentczner. Macaroons: Cookies with
contextual caveats for decentralized authorization in the
cloud. In Network and Distributed System Security Sympo-
sium, 2014.
[21] A. Biryukov, D. Khovratovich, and I. Pustogarov.
Deanonymisation of clients in bitcoin P2P network. In
21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, 2014.
[22] A. Biryukov, I. Pustogarov, and R. Weinmann. Trawl-
ing for Tor Hidden Services: Detection, measurement,
deanonymization. In IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy,, 2013.
[23] J. Biskup and U. Flegel. Threshold-based identity recovery
for privacy enhanced applications. In 7th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, 2000.
[24] BitTorrent. http://www.bittorrent.org/. Last accessed:
June 29, 2017.
[25] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, and A. D. Keromytis. Keynote:
Trust Management for Public-Key Infrastructures (posi-
tion paper). In 6th International Workshop on Security
Protocols, 1998.
[26] D. Bogdanov, S. Laur, and J. Willemson. Sharemind: A
framework for fast privacy-preserving computations. In 13th
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security.
2008.
[27] N. Borisov, G. Danezis, and I. Goldberg. DP5: A private
presence service. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Tech-
nologies, 2015(2):4–24, 2015.
[28] The Briar Project. https://briarproject.org. Last accessed:
June 29, 2017.
[29] S. Buchegger, D. Schiöberg, L. Vu, and A. Datta. Peer-
SoN: P2P social networking: early experiences and insights.
In 2nd ACM EuroSys Workshop on Social Network Sys-
tems, 2009.
[30] J. Camenisch, S. Hohenberger, M. Kohlweiss, A. Lysyan-
skaya, and M. Meyerovich. How to win the clonewars:
efficient periodic n-times anonymous authentication. In
13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, 2006.
[31] J. Camenisch and A. Lysyanskaya. An efficient system
for non-transferable anonymous credentials with optional
anonymity revocation. In International Conference on
the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques
Advances in Cryptology, 2001.
[32] J. Camenisch, A. Lysyanskaya, and M. Meyerovich. En-
dorsed e-cash. In 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, 2007.
[33] M. Castro, P. Druschel, A. J. Ganesh, A. I. T. Rowstron,
and D. S. Wallach. Secure routing for structured peer-
to-peer overlay networks. In 5th USENIX Symposium on
Operating System Design and Implementation, 2002.
[34] H. Chan and A. Perrig. Efficient security primitives de-
rived from a secure aggregation algorithm. In 15th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
2008.
[35] F. Chang, J. Dean, S. Ghemawat, W. C. Hsieh, D. A. Wal-
lach, M. Burrows, T. Chandra, A. Fikes, and R. E. Gruber.
Bigtable: A distributed storage system for structured data.
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS), 2008.
[36] D. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses,
and digital pseudonyms. Commun. ACM, 1981.
[37] D. Chaum. The Dining Cryptographers problem: Uncon-
ditional sender and recipient untraceability. J. Cryptology,
1988.
[38] Y. Chen, R. Sion, and B. Carbunar. XPay: practical anony-
mous payments for tor routing and other networked ser-
vices. In ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic
Society, 2009.
[39] B. Chor, E. Kushilevitz, O. Goldreich, and M. Sudan. Pri-
vate information retrieval. J. ACM, 1998.
[40] J. Claessens, C. Díaz, C. Goemans, J. Dumortier, B. Pre-
neel, and J. Vandewalle. Revocable anonymous access to
the Internet? Internet Research, 2003.
[41] I. Clarke, O. Sandberg, B. Wiley, and T. W. Hong.
Freenet: A distributed anonymous information storage
and retrieval system. In Designing Privacy Enhancing
Technologies, International Workshop on Design Issues
in Anonymity and Unobservability, 2000.
[42] H. Corrigan-Gibbs, D. Boneh, and D. Mazières. Riposte:
An anonymous messaging system handling millions of
users. In 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
2015.
[43] E. Damiani, S. D. C. di Vimercati, S. Paraboschi, P. Sama-
rati, and F. Violante. A reputation-based approach for
choosing reliable resources in peer-to-peer networks. In
9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, 2002.
[44] G. Danezis, C. Díaz, C. Troncoso, and B. Laurie. Drac: An
architecture for anonymous low-volume communications. In
10th Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium, 2010.
[45] G. Danezis, R. Dingledine, and N. Mathewson. Mixminion:
Design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2003.
[46] G. Danezis, C. Lesniewski-Laas, M. F. Kaashoek, and
R. Anderson. Sybil-resistant dht routing. In European
Symposium On Research In Computer Security, pages 305–
318. Springer, 2005.
[47] G. Danezis and P. Mittal. SybilInfer: Detecting sybil nodes
using social networks. In Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, 2009.
[48] Critical update re: Dao vulnerability. https://blog.
ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-
vulnerability/. Last accessed: June 29, 2017.
[49] J. Dean and S. Ghemawat. MapReduce: simplified data
processing on large clusters. Communications of the ACM,
2008.
[50] C. Decker, R. Eidenbenz, and R. Wattenhofer. Exploring
and improving BitTorrent topologies. In 13th IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, 2013.
Systematizing Decentralization and Privacy 326
[51] diaspora*: The online social world where you are in control.
https://diasporafoundation.org/. Last accessed: June 29,
2017.
[52] C. Díaz, G. Danezis, C. Grothoff, A. Pfitzmann, and P. F.
Syverson. Panel Discussion - Mix Cascades Versus Peer-
to-Peer: Is One Concept Superior? In Privacy Enhancing
Technologies, pages 242–242, 2004.
[53] C. Díaz, S. J. Murdoch, and C. Troncoso. Impact of net-
work topology on anonymity and overhead in low-latency
anonymity networks. In 10th Privacy Enhancing Technolo-
gies Symposium, 2010.
[54] C. Diaz, O. Tene, and S. Gurses. Hero or villain: The data
controller in privacy law and technologies. Ohio St. LJ,
74:923–963, 2013.
[55] R. Dingledine and N. Mathewson. Anonymity loves com-
pany: Usability and the network effect. In 5th Workshop on
the Economics of Information Security (WEIS), 2006.
[56] R. Dingledine and N. Mathewson. Design of a blocking-
resistant anonymity system. The Tor Project, Tech. Rep, 1,
2006.
[57] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. F. Syverson. Tor:
The second-generation onion router. In 13th USENIX
Security Symposium, 2004.
[58] Dot-Bit: Secure Decentralized DNS. https://bit.namecoin.
info/. Last accessed: June 29, 2017.
[59] J. R. Douceur. The sybil attack. In 1st International
Worksop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, 2002.
[60] Y. Duan, N. Youdao, J. Canny, and J. Z. Zhan. P4P: prac-
tical large-scale privacy-preserving distributed computation
robust against malicious users. In 19th USENIX Security
Symposium, 2010.
[61] M. Edman and P. F. Syverson. AS-awareness in tor path
selection. In 16th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, 2009.
[62] e-gold. http://e-gold.com/. Last accessed: June 29, 2017.
[63] T. Elahi, G. Danezis, and I. Goldberg. PrivEx: Private
collection of traffic statistics for anonymous communica-
tion networks. In 21st ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, 2014.
[64] C. M. Ellison. Establishing identity without certification
authorities. In 6th USENIX Security Symposium, 1996.
[65] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor. A key-management
scheme for distributed sensor networks. In 9th ACM Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security, 2002.
[66] Ethereum Project. https://www.ethereum.org/. Last
accessed: June 29, 2017.
[67] European Data Protection Supervisor. Opinion on privacy
in the digital age (march 2010): "Privacy by Design" as a
key tool to ensure citizen’s trust in ICTS, 2010.
[68] A. J. Feldman, A. Blankstein, M. J. Freedman, and E. W.
Felten. Social networking with Frientegrity: Privacy and
integrity with an untrusted provider. In 21th USENIX
Security Symposium, 2012.
[69] M. Feldotto, C. Scheideler, and K. Graffi. HSkip+: A self-
stabilizing overlay network for nodes with heterogeneous
bandwidths. In 14th IEEE International Conference on
Peer-to-Peer Computing, 2014.
[70] M. J. Freedman and R. Morris. Tarzan: A peer-to-peer
anonymizing network layer. In 9th ACM conference on
Computer and communications security, 2002.
[71] J. Freudiger, M. H. Manshaei, J. Hubaux, and D. C.
Parkes. On non-cooperative location privacy: a game-
theoretic analysis. In 16th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, 2009.
[72] R. Geambasu, T. Kohno, A. A. Levy, and H. M. Levy. Van-
ish: Increasing data privacy with self-destructing data. In
18th USENIX Security Symposium, 2009.
[73] Gnutella: File sharing and distribution network. http://rfc-
gnutella.sourceforge.net/. Last accessed: June 29, 2017.
[74] G. Greenwald. No place to hide: Edward Snowden, the
NSA, and the US surveillance state. Macmillan, 2014.
[75] D. A. Gritzalis. Secure electronic voting, volume 7.
Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
[76] E. Heilman, A. Kendler, A. Zohar, and S. Goldberg. Eclipse
attacks on Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network. In 24th USENIX
Security Symposium, 2015.
[77] S. Helmers. A brief history of anon.penet.fi: the legendary
anonymous remailer. CMC Magazine, 1997.
[78] M. Herrmann and C. Grothoff. Privacy-implications of
performance-based peer selection by onion-routers: A real-
world case study using I2P. In Privacy Enhancing Tech-
nologies, 2011.
[79] K. J. Hoffman, D. Zage, and C. Nita-Rotaru. A survey of
attack and defense techniques for reputation systems. ACM
Comput. Surv., 2009.
[80] S. Hohenberger, S. Myers, R. Pass, and A. Shelat. AN-
ONIZE: A large-scale anonymous survey system. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2014.
[81] I2P: The invisible internet project. https://geti2p.net/en/.
Last accessed: June 29, 2017.
[82] R. Janakiraman, M. Waldvogel, and Q. Zhang. Indra:
A peer-to-peer approach to network intrusion detection
and prevention. In 12th IEEE International Workshops on
Enabling Technologies, 2003.
[83] A. Johnson, P. F. Syverson, R. Dingledine, and N. Math-
ewson. Trust-based anonymous communication: adversary
models and routing algorithms. In 18th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, 2011.
[84] A. Johnson, C. Wacek, R. Jansen, M. Sherr, and P. F.
Syverson. Users get routed: traffic correlation on Tor by
realistic adversaries. In 20th ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, 2013.
[85] P. C. Johnson, A. Kapadia, P. P. Tsang, and S. W. Smith.
Nymble: Anonymous IP-address blocking. In 7th Privacy
Enhancing Technologies Symposium, 2007.
[86] J. Juen, A. Johnson, A. Das, N. Borisov, and M. Caesar.
Defending Tor from network adversaries: A case study of
network path prediction. PoPETs, 2015.
[87] M. Kallahalla, E. Riedel, R. Swaminathan, Q. Wang, and
K. Fu. Plutus: Scalable secure file sharing on untrusted
storage. In USENIX Conference on File and Storage Tech-
nologies, 2003.
[88] A. Kapadia and N. Triandopoulos. Halo: High-assurance lo-
cate for distributed hash tables. In Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium, 2008.
[89] G. Karame, E. Androulaki, and S. Capkun. Double-
spending fast payments in Bitcoin. In 19th ACM Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security, 2012.
[90] R. Kumaresan and I. Bentov. How to use Bitcoin to in-
centivize correct computations. In 21st ACM SIGSAC
Systematizing Decentralization and Privacy 327
Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
2014.
[91] L. Lamport. Time, clocks, and the ordering of events in a
distributed system. Communications of the ACM, 21(7),
1978.
[92] B. Laurie. Certificate transparency. Queue, 2014.
[93] S. Le Blond, P. Manils, A. Chaabane, M. A. Kaafar,
A. Legout, C. Castellucia, and W. Dabbous. Poster: De-
anonymizing BitTorrent users on Tor. In 7th USENIX Sym-
posium on Network Design and Implementation (NSDI’10),
2010.
[94] C. Lesniewski-Laas, B. Ford, J. Strauss, R. Morris, and
M. F. Kaashoek. Alpaca: extensible authorization for dis-
tributed services. In 14th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, 2007.
[95] F. Lesueur, L. Mé, and V. V. T. Tong. An efficient dis-
tributed PKI for structured P2P networks. In 9th Interna-
tional Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, 2009.
[96] N. Li, W. H. Winsborough, and J. C. Mitchell. Distributed
credential chain discovery in trust management. Journal of
Computer Security, 2003.
[97] Z. Li, S. Alrwais, Y. Xie, F. Yu, and X. Wang. Finding
the linchpins of the dark web: a study on topologically
dedicated hosts on malicious web infrastructures. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2013.
[98] Y. Liu and J. Pan. The impact of NAT on BitTorrent-like
P2P systems. In 9th International Conference on Peer-to-
Peer Computing, 2009.
[99] J. Maheswaran, D. I. Wolinsky, and B. Ford. Crypto-book:
an architecture for privacy preserving online identities. In
Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM Workshop on Hot Topics
in Networks, page 14. ACM, 2013.
[100] J. McLachlan, A. Tran, N. Hopper, and Y. Kim. Scalable
onion routing with Torsk. In 16th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, 2009.
[101] M. S. Melara, A. Blankstein, J. Bonneau, E. W. Felten,
and M. J. Freedman. CONIKS: bringing key transparency
to end users. In 24th USENIX Security Symposium, 2015.
[102] B. Mitra, F. Peruani, S. Ghose, and N. Ganguly. Analyzing
the vulnerability of superpeer networks against attack. In
14th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, 2007.
[103] P. Mittal and N. Borisov. Information leaks in structured
peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems. In 15th
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity, 2008.
[104] P. Mittal and N. Borisov. ShadowWalker: peer-to-peer
anonymous communication using redundant structured
topologies. In 16th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, 2009.
[105] P. Mittal, M. Caesar, and N. Borisov. X-Vine: Secure and
pseudonymous routing in DHTs using social networks. In
19th Network and Distributed System Security Symposium,
2012.
[106] P. Mittal, F. G. Olumofin, C. Troncoso, N. Borisov, and
I. Goldberg. PIR-Tor: Scalable anonymous communica-
tion using private information retrieval. In 20th USENIX
Security Symposium, 2011.
[107] P. Mittal, C. Papamanthou, and D. Song. Preserving link
privacy in social network based systems. In 20th Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium(NDSS). Inter-
net Society, 2013.
[108] P. Mittal, M. K. Wright, and N. Borisov. Pisces: Anony-
mous communication using social networks. In 20th Net-
work and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2013.
[109] F. Monrose and S. Krishnan. DNS prefetching and its
privacy implications: When good things go bad. In 3rd
USENIX Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent
Threats, 2010.
[110] S. J. Murdoch and R. N. M. Watson. Metrics for security
and performance in low-latency anonymity systems. In 8th
Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium, 2008.
[111] S. J. Murdoch and P. Zielinski. Sampled traffic analysis
by Internet-exchange-level adversaries. In 7th International
Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2007.
[112] S. Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash sys-
tem, 2008.
[113] A. Nambiar and M. K. Wright. Salsa: a structured ap-
proach to large-scale anonymity. In 13th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS, 2006.
[114] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov. De-anonymizing social
networks. In 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Pri-
vacy, 2009.
[115] A. Narayanan, V. Toubiana, S. Barocas, H. Nissenbaum,
and D. Boneh. A critical look at decentralized personal
data architectures. arXiv preprint arXiv:1202.4503, 2012.
[116] M. A. U. Nasir, S. Girdzijauskas, and N. Kourtellis.
Socially-aware distributed hash tables for decentralized
online social networks. In IEEE International Conference on
Peer-to-Peer Computing, 2015.
[117] S. Nilizadeh, S. Jahid, P. Mittal, N. Borisov, and A. Ka-
padia. Cachet: a decentralized architecture for privacy
preserving social networking with caching. In Conference on
emerging Networking Experiments and Technologies, 2012.
[118] A. Oram. Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the power of disruptive
technologies. O’Reilly, 2001.
[119] B. Parno, A. Perrig, and V. D. Gligor. Distributed detec-
tion of node replication attacks in sensor networks. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2005.
[120] T. Paul, A. Famulari, and T. Strufe. A survey on decentral-
ized Online Social Networks. Computer Networks, 2014.
[121] A. Pfitzmann and M. Hansen. Anonymity, unlinkability,
unobservability, pseudonymity, and identity management –
a consolidated proposal for terminology. Technical report,
2005.
[122] Pluggable transports. https://obfuscation.github.io/. Last
accessed: June 29, 2017.
[123] J. Postel. IETF RFC 821 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol.
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc821.txt, 1982. Last accessed:
June 29, 2017.
[124] J. A. Pouwelse, P. Garbacki, J. Wang, A. Bakker, J. Yang,
A. Iosup, D. H. J. Epema, M. J. T. Reinders, M. van
Steen, and H. J. Sips. Tribler: A social-based peer-to-peer
system. In 5th International workshop on Peer-To-Peer
Systems (IPTPS), 2006.
[125] T. Pulls, R. Peeters, and K. Wouters. Distributed privacy-
preserving transparency logging. In 12th ACM Workshop
on Privacy in the Electronic Society,, 2013.
[126] M. A. Rajab, F. Monrose, and A. Terzis. On the effec-
tiveness of distributed worm monitoring. In 14th USENIX
Systematizing Decentralization and Privacy 328
Security Symposium, 2005.
[127] M. Raya, M. H. Manshaei, M. Félegyházi, and J. Hubaux.
Revocation games in ephemeral networks. In 15th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
2008.
[128] Redecentralize.org. http://redecentralize.org/. Last ac-
cessed: June 29, 2017.
[129] M. K. Reiter and A. D. Rubin. Crowds: Anonymity for web
transactions. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., 1998.
[130] Y. Rekhter, T. Li, and S. Hares. A border gateway protocol
4 (BGP-4). Technical report, 2005.
[131] Reproducible Builds - Provide a verifiable path from source
code to binary. https://reproducible-builds.org/. Last
accessed: June 29, 2017.
[132] R. L. Rivest and B. Lampson. Sdsi-a simple distributed
security infrastructure. Crypto, 1996.
[133] P. Rogaway and M. Bellare. Robust computational secret
sharing and a unified account of classical secret-sharing
goals. In 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Commu-
nications Security, 2007.
[134] C. Rossow, D. Andriesse, T. Werner, B. Stone-Gross,
D. Plohmann, C. J. Dietrich, and H. Bos. SoK: P2PWNED
- modeling and evaluating the resilience of peer-to-peer
botnets. In 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
2013.
[135] J. M. Rushby. Design and verification of secure systems,
volume 15. ACM, 1981.
[136] P. Schaar. Privacy by design. Identity in the Information
Society, 3(2):267–274, 2010.
[137] S. Schiffner, A. Pashalidis, and E. Tischhauser. On the lim-
its of privacy in reputation systems. In 10th ACM workshop
on Privacy in the electronic society, 2011.
[138] B. Schmidt, R. Sasse, C. Cremers, and D. A. Basin. Au-
tomated verification of group key agreement protocols. In
2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2014.
[139] M. Selimi and F. Freitag. Tahoe-LAFS distributed stor-
age service in community network clouds. In 2014 IEEE
Fourth International Conference on Big Data and Cloud
Computing, BDCloud 2014, Sydney, Australia, December
3-5, 2014, pages 17–24, 2014.
[140] S.-W. Seong, J. Seo, M. Nasielski, D. Sengupta, S. Hangal,
S. K. Teh, R. Chu, B. Dodson, and M. S. Lam. PrPl: a
decentralized social networking infrastructure. In 1st ACM
Workshop on Mobile Cloud Computing & Services: Social
Networks and Beyond, 2010.
[141] A. Shamir. How to share a secret. Commun. ACM, 1979.
[142] R. Sharma and A. Datta. SuperNova: Super-peers based
architecture for decentralized online social networks. In 4th
International Conference on Communication Systems and
Networks, 2012.
[143] M. Sherr, M. Blaze, and B. T. Loo. Scalable link-based
relay selection for anonymous routing. In 9th Privacy En-
hancing Technologies Symposium, 2009.
[144] R. Snader and N. Borisov. A tune-up for Tor: Improving se-
curity and performance in the tor network. In 15th Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2008.
[145] E. Sparrow, H. Halpin, K. Kaneko, and R. Pollan. LEAP: A
next-generation client VPN and encrypted email provider.
In International Conference on Cryptology and Network
Security, pages 176–191. Springer, 2016.
[146] E. Stefanov and E. Shi. Multi-cloud oblivious storage. In
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security, 2013.
[147] I. Stoica, R. Morris, D. R. Karger, M. F. Kaashoek, and
H. Balakrishnan. Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup
service for Internet applications. In SIGCOMM, 2001.
[148] M. W. Storer, K. M. Greenan, E. L. Miller, and K. Voru-
ganti. POTSHARDS: secure long-term storage without
encryption. 2007.
[149] R. Süselbeck, G. Schiele, P. Komarnicki, and C. Becker.
Efficient bandwidth estimation for peer-to-peer systems. In
IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing,
2011.
[150] P. F. Syverson, D. M. Goldschlag, and M. G. Reed. Anony-
mous connections and onion routing. In IEEE Symposium
on Security & Privacy, 1997.
[151] Taler: Taxable anonymous libre electronic reserve. https:
//taler.net/. Last accessed: June 29, 2017.
[152] C. Tang and I. Goldberg. An improved algorithm for tor
circuit scheduling. In 17th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, 2010.
[153] A. Tran, N. Hopper, and Y. Kim. Hashing it out in public:
common failure modes of DHT-based anonymity schemes.
In ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society,
2009.
[154] P. P. Tsang, M. H. Au, A. Kapadia, and S. W. Smith.
Blacklistable anonymous credentials: blocking misbehaving
users without ttps. In 14th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, 2007.
[155] P. P. Tsang, M. H. Au, A. Kapadia, and S. W. Smith.
PEREA: towards practical TTP-free revocation in anony-
mous authentication. In 15th ACM Conference on Com-
puter and Communications Security, 2008.
[156] P. P. Tsang, A. Kapadia, C. Cornelius, and S. W. Smith.
Nymble: Blocking misbehaving users in anonymizing net-
works. IEEE Trans. Dependable Sec. Comput., 2011.
[157] E. Y. Vasserman, R. Jansen, J. Tyra, N. Hopper, and
Y. Kim. Membership-concealing overlay networks. In
16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, 2009.
[158] J. Verkamp and M. Gupta. Inferring mechanics of web
censorship around the world. In 2nd USENIX Workshop on
Free and Open Communications on the Internet, 2012.
[159] C. Wacek, H. Tan, K. S. Bauer, and M. Sherr. An empir-
ical evaluation of relay selection in Tor. In 20th Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2013.
[160] M. Wachs, F. Oehlmann, and C. Grothoff. Automatic
transport selection and resource allocation for resilient
communication in decentralised networks. In 14th IEEE
International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, 2014.
[161] M. Wachs, M. Schanzenbach, and C. Grothoff. A
censorship-resistant, privacy-enhancing and fully decen-
tralized name system. In 13th International Conference on
Cryptology and Network Security, 2014.
[162] M. Waldman and D. Mazières. Tangler: a censorship-
resistant publishing system based on document entangle-
ments. In 8th ACM Conference on Computer and Commu-
nications Security, 2001.
[163] M. Waldman, A. D. Rubin, and L. F. Cranor. Publius: A
robust, tamper-evident, censorship-resistant, and source-
Systematizing Decentralization and Privacy 329
anonymous web publishing system. In 9th USENIX Security
Symposium, 2000.
[164] L. Wang and J. Kangasharju. Measuring large-scale dis-
tributed systems: case of BitTorrent mainline DHT. In 13th
IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing,
2013.
[165] Q. Wang, Z. Lin, N. Borisov, and N. Hopper. rBridge:
User reputation based Tor bridge distribution with privacy
preservation. In 20th Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, 2013.
[166] Q. Wang, P. Mittal, and N. Borisov. In search of an anony-
mous and secure lookup: attacks on structured peer-to-peer
anonymous communication systems. In 17th ACM Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security, 2010.
[167] X. Wang, S. Chen, and S. Jajodia. Tracking anonymous
peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the Internet. In 12th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
2005.
[168] B. Wilcox-O’Hearn. Experiences deploying a large-scale
emergent network. In International Workshop on Peer-to-
Peer Systems, pages 104–110. Springer, 2002.
[169] M. Winslett, C. C. Zhang, and P. A. Bonatti. PeerAccess:
a logic for distributed authorization. In 12th ACM Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security, 2005.
[170] E. Wobber, M. Abadi, M. Burrows, and B. Lampson. Au-
thentication in the taos operating system. ACM Transac-
tions on Computer Systems (TOCS), 12(1):3–32, 1994.
[171] E. Wobber, M. Abadi, M. Burrows, and B. W. Lampson.
Authentication in the Taos operating system. In 14th ACM
Symposium on Operating System Principles, 1993.
[172] S. Wolchok, O. S. Hofmann, N. Heninger, E. W. Fel-
ten, J. A. Halderman, C. J. Rossbach, B. Waters, and
E. Witchel. Defeating Vanish with low-cost sybil attacks
against large DHTs. In Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, 2010.
[173] D. I. Wolinsky, H. Corrigan-Gibbs, B. Ford, and A. John-
son. Dissent in numbers: Making strong anonymity scale.
In 10th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design
and Implementation, 2012.
[174] M. K. Wright, M. Adler, B. N. Levine, and C. Shields. An
analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium,
2002.
[175] M. K. Wright, M. Adler, B. N. Levine, and C. Shields. The
predecessor attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous
communications systems. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.,
2004.
[176] J. J. Wylie, M. W. Bigrigg, J. D. Strunk, G. R. Ganger,
H. Kiliççöte, and P. K. Khosla. Survivable information
storage systems. IEEE Computer, 2000.
[177] YaCy: The Peer to Peer Search Engine. http://yacy.net/
en/index.html. Last accessed: June 29, 2017.
[178] B. Yang and H. Garcia-Molina. PPay: micropayments
for peer-to-peer systems. In 10th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications, 2003.
[179] youbroketheinternet. http://youbroketheinternet.org/. Last
accessed: June 29, 2017.
[180] M. Young, A. Kate, I. Goldberg, and M. Karsten. Practical
robust communication in DHTs tolerating a Byzantine
adversary. In ICDCS, 2010.
[181] H. Yu, P. B. Gibbons, M. Kaminsky, and F. Xiao. Sybil-
Limit: A near-optimal social network defense against Sybil
attacks. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., 2010.
[182] H. Yu, P. B. Gibbons, and C. Shi. DCast: sustaining col-
laboration in overlay multicast despite rational collusion. In
19th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, 2012.
[183] D. J. Zage and C. Nita-Rotaru. On the accuracy of decen-
tralized virtual coordinate systems in adversarial networks.
In 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security, 2007.
[184] E. Zhai, R. Chen, Z. Cai, L. Zhang, E. K. Lua, H. Sun,
S. Qing, L. Tang, and Z. Chen. Sorcery: Could we make
P2P content sharing systems robust to deceivers? In 9th
IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing,
2009.
[185] E. Zhai, D. I. Wolinsky, R. Chen, E. Syta, C. Teng, and
B. Ford. Anonrep: Towards tracking-resistant anonymous
reputation. In 13th USENIX Symposium on Networked
Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI 16), pages
583–596. USENIX Association, 2016.
[186] X. Zhang, H.-C. Hsiao, G. Hasker, H. Chan, A. Perrig, and
D. G. Andersen. SCION: Scalability, control, and isola-
tion on next-generation networks. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, 2011.
[187] B. Zhu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia. Providing witness
anonymity in peer-to-peer systems. In 13th ACM Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security, 2006.
[188] S. Zhu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia. LEAP&plus;: Efficient
security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor net-
works. TOSN, 2006.
[189] G. Zyskind, O. Nathan, and A. Pentland. Enigma: De-
centralized computation platform with guaranteed privacy.
CoRR, abs/1506.03471, 2015.
